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Abstract 
The European Union took more than 20 years to start defining a common market design for its internal 
electricity market: a European Power Target Model. And, a further 10 years to fully implement it. 
Meanwhile, the reference generation set of that model has shifted from CCGT burning gas to RES 
units transforming intermittent natural resources. Could the existing EU target model continue to work 
well for the short- term operation and long-term investment? If not, can the existing EU institutions 
easily produce an "RES resilient" new power target model? 
Keywords 
Market Design; Power Market; EU Internal Market; EU Target Model; Energy Union. 
Highlights 
The European Union has a “continent scale” power target model; while the USA and Canada have no 
such model. 
But, it took decades (since the first “internal market” directive in 1996) to produce it, and it largely 
relies on the former concept of EU- wide “cross-border CCGT competition”.  
The corresponding market pricing is zonal and mainly Day-Ahead; the power system operation is also 
zonal, both intra-day or “real-time”. Will this Target Model resist the integration of massive 
renewables?  
Would the EU easily produce a new Target Model to integrate massive renewables? Or, would it 
prefer to keep the existing one and upgrade it with a few “add-ons”? 
I do not yet foresee if the EU will succeed in undertaking all of the challenging but necessary “target 
model” upgrades to enter soon a 2030 forward- looking strategy. 
 1 
Introduction* 
There is no doubt that the European Union has a power target model (Glachant & Ruester 2014). This, 
in itself, is remarkable as it is not easy to establish in large “continent scale” societies and power 
systems (as evident with the USA and Canada). However, it is not a complete surprise, because what 
the EU calls the “achievement of an internal market” has been a key European policy goal since… 
1986. It is nevertheless significant that it took so long to reach this point, and it is questionable 
whether the 30 year journey has culminated in a fundamentally robust (Oggioni & Smeers 2013) 
‘catch-all power system changes’ target model. 
I will examine the issue in this paper and argue: 1° that the current EU power target model calls for 
many changes largely unforeseen when it first started to take shape in 2004-2009; and 2° that we 
cannot yet know if the EU will succeed in undertaking all of the necessary and challenging ‘Target 
Model’ upgrades. My paper will take stock of the EU power target model as it is: on its own sliding 
scale. I will do it in three stages.  
In the first part, I will recall how the EU opened its many national power markets without a ‘Target 
Model’ of any kind (and then without a common ‘Market Design’) and remained as such for 13 years 
(1996-2009). A ‘Target Model’ finally emerged, but it had never been defined in any European single 
regulation or Green Paper. It has been produced by qualified European actors through an institutional 
process originated in the 3d European Energy Package. This ‘Target Model’ has at least three key 
characteristics. 1° It brings a large “merit order” at a European scale from a reference pricing 
mechanism, that of energy traded in Power Exchanges on Day-Ahead. 2° It simplifies TSO cross-
border trading by “zoning” the grids, as if each EU TSO grid was some type of “national copper 
plate”; and, by “coupling” the allocation of grid access between these “zoned area copper plate” grids 
with the merit order built into the PXs in Day-Ahead trading. This is done only after having chosen a 
guaranteed inter-zonal capacity calculated ex ante (on the same Day-Ahead horizon) by the grid 
transmission operators (the TSOs). 3° This ‘Target Model’ has its own “last mile” hard task of 
opening a similar “zones cross-border” process for the shortest time frames (Intraday & Balancing), so 
as to “Europeanise” the last step toward power reserve and energy balancing procurement between the 
TSO grid zones.  
Secondly, I will question the existing ‘Target Model’ and ask, “what if…” several key 
characteristics of this model should have to change because the EU power system is itself in transition, 
notably under massive renewables integration. In different system conditions, would the same target 
model allow for further European integration with enough economic efficiency and network reliability 
(Neuhoff & al, 2015)? Finally, I will consider if the ‘Energy Union’ policy currently being heavily 
debated at EU level is committing to a much-needed upgrade of the EU power target model, or only 
aiming to improve it. 
[I] The long march toward an EU ‘Power Target Model’ (1996-2014) 
To assess the current terms of the EU power target model and its ability to change and adapt, it is 
useful to consider the founding motivations of the European “single market” toward the end of the last 
century (Glachant & Lévêque, 2009). In 1986, the European leaders pushed forward the European 
dream of a “Single Act” whereby all industry and commercial trade within and between the Member 
States would have to become fully “European”, as if only a single market existed at European level. It 
was a Single Act for a Single Market. This journey had a target for implementation: 1992. It took all 
                                                     
*
 I do thank Andres Delgadillo and Anne-Marie Kehoe (both research assistants at Florence School of Regulation) for the 
help provided in searching documents or proofing the drafts. 
Mapping the course of the EU “Power Target Model”... on its own terms 
2 
of six years to simply open a new way of “power wheeling” at EU level ([]France was more or less 
allowed to send power to Portugal by injecting it into Spain); and an organised collection of MS power 
prices to clearly define, for Europeans, who was paying what, when consuming electricity. Finally, in 
1996, 10 years after the Single Act, and 6 years after the opening of the “Electricity Pool of England 
and Wales” in the UK (where both Scotland and France were welcomed as “external parties”), the EU 
got its very first Power Directive (usually called “the 1st Energy Package”).  
This package gave a right to big consumers (such as the “electro- intensives” and the railways etc.) 
to shop around; and a duty to existing suppliers to include any new supply contract contracted with a 
Third Party in their portfolio of supply, if they wished to be referred to as a ‘Single Buyer’ in their 
MS. Accordingly, the transmission grids had to implement the corresponding flows (injections and 
withdrawals) and became ‘Transmission System Operators’ with a duty to treat all suppliers more or 
less the same in a “Third Party Access” scheme. With no regulatory office being set up at MS level 
and no obligation of “regulated TPA”, it was accepted that the grids could offer only ‘negotiated 
TPA”. Germany, for example, made it very simple by creating a “de facto” cartel of grids, suppliers, 
traders and big industrial consumers which defined and enforced the rules of “national negotiated 
TPA” (under the benevolent ex post monitoring of the national Competition Authority: the 
BundesKartellAMT). The EU market began in this way. As Leigh Hancher rightly commented; each 
MS had its own single market; and trading from one European single market to another one was quite 
a journey. No EU market design was provided or even discussed. It was simply the opposite to the 
process of opening the market in the UK or California, where market rules were issued just before the 
opening (whether these rules were right or wrong is another issue). 
It took six more years to develop the Commission, with MS and the Parliament convinced that a 2
nd
 
Package (which came about in 2002) was necessary for a truly single market. To sweeten the prospect, 
it was promoted as giving “shopping rights” (called “eligibility”) to all consumers (Sencar & al, 2014). 
Regulatory bodies in each MS were made mandatory, as “regulated TPA” itself was also made 
mandatory. The rights and duties of the TSOs were accordingly enhanced and upgraded and, step by 
step, the key elements of a European common market design were identified and named. A whole set 
of questions and principles were being discussed to make cross-border trade between MS appear as 
“seamless” as possible, as in a truly single “single market”. Up until 2006, the Commission was 
thinking (or was, at least, saying that it was thinking) that this new set of market arrangements would 
come from a dialogue among stakeholders (the Florence Forum process etc.) in addition to initiatives 
taken at regional level by MS or industry players (such as TSOs, or PXs). However, parallel to this 
open horizontal process, the Commission opened a rough “sector competition enquiry” led by DG 
Comp, which aimed at showing where the national barriers to EU-wide trade would need to be 
overcome. This enquiry also found a few “smoking guns”, which forced several utilities (such as the 
German ones) to face the Commission on what they fiercely refused to even discuss at the MS 
political level. Just after this, in 2007, under the German Presidency of Europe, the EU MS adopted 
the so-called “20-20-20” policy, which opened a very “rosy” period for the improvement of the 
European power market, as it created the first and the largest ever common energy policy at EU level. 
However, no new market design was incorporated in the resulting 3d Energy Package (adopted in 
2009), but an institutional framework was set up, which would later become instrumental in 
determining the European design. With the unbundling of the TSOs, the creation of a European body 
of TSOs with rights and duties named the “ENTSO-E” (no longer a purely private association, as was 
its predecessor ETSOE), and the establishment of a European agency for the cooperation of national 
energy regulators (ACER); the way forward with design was open institutionally. As a result, a 
European market design grew out of the drafting of the very first EU grid codes co-developed by the 
ENTSO-E, ACER and the Commission with a final backing by MS in the very special “EU detailed 
regulation” formal approval, named the “Comitology Process”.  
Three characteristics of this consensus design are key. Firstly, the emerging EU target model 
assumes that the crucial step in achieving a power market equilibrium is to get a merit order and an 
Jean-Michel Glachant 
3 
energy price equilibrium on Day -1 (one day ahead) from bids made in organised power exchanges. 
This process mimics what was made at times of vertical integration when each utility had to arrange 
the merit order of its power units for the next day’s generation (according to load estimates from a 
dispatch center). This particular process ensured that beneficial efficiency properties were retained in 
an open market because the technologies used to generate power were similar to the previous ones 
(river hydro or nuclear providing a base; coal a base or mid-merit; and gas, the “baby”, depending on 
relative fuel prices, providing a full range of base, mid-merit and most of the marginal offer). If the 
amount of different technologies in the generation set is adequate for the real annual load curve, and 
the price formation is not capped, each technology can cover its costs and make a profit. With 
European market arrangements, chosen by consensus among the many stakeholders, being welcome in 
the EU open regulatory process (such as the Florence Forum, to make it simple), no “centralised PX” 
has emerged as an anchor of the target model (as E.P E&W was in Great Britain, or PJM is in the US). 
A very basic rule in the EU is the “self-dispatch” of the generating units: all producers look at the 
Day- Ahead pricing process and the resulting merit order, and decide voluntarily whether or not to 
generate and with which unit. A similar basic rule is the freedom of establishment for the Power 
Exchanges, with competing PXs (as formerly in Germany) or parallel PXs (like in the Netherlands, 
Belgium and France). However, MS can also individually opt for “regulated public” exchanges (as in 
Spain and Italy). The second key characteristic has been to simplify the interactions between the “grid 
control zones” for the power traders. Instead of having to deal separately with the “grid capacity” in 
one auction and with “energy trade” in another deal (as in an “explicit auctioning” scheme), energy 
traders are given the right to “implicitly” bid for grid capacity through their energy offers in the Power 
Exchanges. The actual architecture of the grids and the actual graph of power flows within the grids 
disappear from market bargaining and trading in exchanges as long as no “structural” congestion 
appears. Coupled with the self-dispatch freedom for generators as seen above, the “coupling” of 
market places, bypassing or forgetting the grids, is a fundamental feature of our EU target model 
(Neuhoff et al, 2013). The third key characteristic is largely the child of the first two. As the emphasis 
of the market process is placed on day- ahead energy trading without an explicit representation of the 
power system (its actual grids and actual flows), a significant reconciliation has to follow at the end of 
the day: in real time, at the balancing stage. As this reconciliation has to be made by the TSOs, the 
resources which they call upon at this late stage become key in the actual economics of the whole EU 
system. But for each emerging TSO, whether national or sub-national (see Germany or Great Britain), 
the TSOs’ loops, which limit the EU target model process end up, themselves, becoming national or 
sub-national. To Europeanise these remaining market loops as a single EU market would do, one 
needs to open all existing “balancing resources” to all TSOs; at least to all neighbouring TSOs, by 
creating a cross-border pooling of “balancing resources” (Vandezande et al, 2010). Of course, this also 
assumes that actions being taken intra-day by the various players have also been properly cross-border 
coupled. This final step toward an EU target model proved difficult and painful to implement because 
the EU has no regulatory power to develop a regulation of intraday trade for existing power exchanges 
or a regulation of sharing the balancing resources. The existing institutions created by the 3d Package 
(notably the ENTSO-E and ACER) can discuss and draft codes and recommendations, but cannot 
enact them. To have a reasonable chance of achieving the necessary “green light” from the final 
“Member States Comitology process”, a certain consensus has to be reached beforehand. Hence, many 
veto powers empower this or that group of stakeholders. All observers noticed that the EU “market 
coupling” takes all of the existing PXs as they are and leaves each to its own incumbent business of 
“national order books”. Similarly, each existing TSO retains the business of calculating its own “cross-
border capacity” and of choosing the practical action plan to implement it. The European zones are 
indeed coupled in our EU target model, but they are coupled as they are (as national ones) and not as 
they should be if a European coordination centre or several regional coordination centres had to 
rationally and efficiently design all zones, markets and grids to be combined in the operation of the EU 
“single market” (see the recent Florence School of Regulation report: J-M Glachant, V. Rious & J. 
Vasconcelos “A conceptual framework for the evolution of the operation and regulation of electricity 
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transmission systems towards a decarbonised and increasingly integrated electricity system in the 
EU”, EUI, Florence, 2015). 
[II] The EU “RES push” questioning the target model 
The EU finally got its own power target model, which has been empirically produced over two 
decades in a web of trials and errors fed by many stakeholders and reviewed step by step by the 
European Commission, TSOs and National Regulatory Authorities. Meanwhile, since 2008, a big RES 
push has been opened by the 20-20-20 EU policy and accelerated by many national decisions and the 
declining manufacturing costs of RES generating assets.  
II-1 Two typical RES questions to the target model: (1) what does “fully integrating the RES into 
the power market” mean; (2) will market-driven investments then deliver generation adequacy?  
Any RES push is inevitably questioning the EU target model, since this design has roughly been 
conceived as a platform for CCGT plants competing cross-border. Two main questions emerged with 
the RES push (Henriot and Glachant, 2013; Hirth and Ueckerdt, 2013). 1° Why not submit this RES 
wave to the same market discipline of other generation technologies? 2° Will generation investment 
restart smoothly, as soon as RES is integrated as a mundane energy product into the wholesale power 
market (Fagiani et al, 2014)?  
To answer the first question, it was initially argued that integrating the RES in the power market as 
it is, and as it works, was a prerequisite in a market economy and from the EU internal market point of 
view. The EU already has its internal market framework; then RES generation could get some extra 
payment for its low carbon content, but has to remain as a mundane power commodity in the actual 
power system. This first approach, a “melting pot”, so to speak, has been followed by quite the 
opposite approach: the “salad bowl” approach. In the “salad bowl” approach, the way the EU power 
market has already been conceived is not assumed as coming from a single superior intrinsic way of 
building a “real” power market in any place. It is acknowledged that all existing power markets 
already widely differ (PJM, Texas, California, Australia, or Nord Pool, to name a few). It is because 
these many market designs differently arbiter inherent power market trade-offs (in short, power is not 
a mundane commodity to easily exchange); and because they have different generation technology 
sets, grid architectures, system particularities and institutional frameworks. A given market design 
provides to a certain set of generators, in a certain grid and system architecture, and in a certain 
institutional framework, a toolbox of coordination mechanisms, incentive schemes, information and 
settlement devices which do the best possible for them here but not for the others there. It is 
acknowledged that most of RES (at least PV and wind) widely differ from other classical thermal 
technologies (gas, coal, nuclear) for their system characteristics. Getting the best of the “market 
discipline” that is placed on RES investment and operation has to go with specific rules conveying the 
RES to deliver their best for a given power system within the actual limitations of this given system. 
Hence, the “salad bowl” theory won the academic debate; but not yet the policy making in the real 
battle field, with several “thermal-like” market designs remaining, in many cases, the same. 
The second debate is: will market-based investment resume after a full RES market integration? It 
is not yet concluded everywhere, but the battle field has already substantially shifted. Many “classic” 
power economists, having lived in the details for the 25 years since the opening of the “Electricity 
Pool of England & Wales” (for example, Newbery or Green), argue that investment will not 
spontaneously reach the level necessary for system adequacy because of the very unreliable price of 
carbon, a growing uncertainty on the level of consumption for the coming decades, and the already 
fierce pressure of low RES marginal costs on the average wholesale energy prices. In such 
circumstances, a kind of “long term” price contract has to be found if power systems are willing to 
guarantee their future generation adequacy. Several formulas are conceivable. The most popular being 
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a call to investors for a capacity level set by the TSO (a formula named as a “capacity mechanism”). 
To limit the impact of the changes to the EU target model, it was astutely suggested that “capacity 
mechanisms” were just some add-ons, acting as a kind of auxiliary engine helping the generation set to 
reach a decent level at which… the EU target model could continue to work well, smoothly and 
efficiently (see the Eurelectric Manifesto 2013).  
II-2 The whole EU target model is affected by “real” RES integration and “guaranteeing ex ante” 
generation adequacy to the power system  
I would rather think in the opposite way: a full integration of massive RES into the power market and 
a guarantee, to be given ex ante, to reach system generation adequacy can only shake up every bone of 
the existing EU target model (Cepeda & Finon, 2011 and 2013; Henriot & Glachant 2014; Newbery 
2012; Newbery & Grubb 2015).  
The first bone of the existing EU target model is that the Day-Ahead energy market price is a good 
enough proxy of the reality of the power system to rank all generating units by economic merit order 
with a good short term effect (the least system cost of generation) and a good long term effect (the 
economic signal given to generators to choose the technology and the capacity to invest in it). Alas, 
both short- term and long- term effects are affected by massive RES. If the technology and capacity 
choices of generators are to be detached from the internal logic of the Day- Ahead wholesale energy 
market and encapsulated into new “Capacity arrangements”, the system will end up with a set of 
generators chosen from these “Capacity arrangements”; and the future portfolio of feasible Day- 
Ahead merit orders will be pre-determined by these very long- term choices and not by an endogenous 
market equilibrium. The weight of the Day- Ahead energy market pricing in the dynamics of the 
power system is therefore inevitably dwarfed. Furthermore, the ability of the Day- Ahead horizon to 
produce “good enough” economic proxies of the actual state of the power system will seriously 
decline. The likely generated power volumes of PV and wind are better predicted at shorter horizon 
spans than the Day- Ahead, and the same is true for their likely actual economic value for the system. 
The Day- Ahead energy pricing is then seriously weakened as a good proxy of the power system needs 
and capabilities.  
The second bone of the existing EU target model, “easing cross-border access”, has also seen the 
RES shift away from Day- Ahead pricing. This is because the EU target model eases cross-zone power 
trade by simplifying both the grid architecture and the flows constraints at the Day- Ahead stage. If 
better proxies of the changing power system reality could only be found and signalled at a later stage 
that Day- Ahead, the accuracy and the efficiency of the brilliant “Day- Ahead market coupling” 
copper-plate would be deeply questioned. 
The three bones of the existing EU target model are in fact a long and comprehensive market and 
system loop: first Day- Ahead energy pricing; second Market Coupling; then, and third, closing the 
gaps with reserves and balancing energy. It is then inevitable that the third bone and final stage of the 
existing target model (“Closing the gaps”) is also to be questioned along with the two others 
(Doorman & van der Reen, 2013). The EU TSOs have the knowledge and the tools to operate a 
dispatchable hydro and thermal generating system across their respective zones from decisions made 
at national level by these TSOs. However, this is difficult to manage if the positions taken by 
generators at each stage (Day- Ahead, Intraday, Real Time) are not closely linked to the value for the 
“power system as a whole” of each generator’s actions at each stage (Brijs & al, 2015). In any three 
stage equilibrium, the generators gently “challenge” or “game” the system by building “financial 
proprietary algorithms”, which privately value each of their individual deviations vis-à-vis the power 
system. In a system with much more intermittent generation, generators discover later, or more slowly, 
where they will actually be positioned vis-à-vis the system at the end of the three stages. Hence, the 
TSOs fear that they will be “arbitraged” or gamed too much by the generators (or by the suppliers; or 
by the parties responsible for balancing). Furthermore, the TSOs no longer believe that it will be 
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sufficient for them to “pool” their reserves and balancing tools across grid zones as in the existing EU 
target model. And, they would like to have much more sophisticated mechanisms to make generators 
(suppliers, BRPs) engage with the “system value” of their actions and imbalances; and therefore, be 
much more proactive in the coverage of their system needs at the final stage. Hence, if RES 
integration is to be massive, the “very late last stage procurement of balancing within existing grid 
zones” is no longer seen as the alpha and omega of the closing loop of the successive stages of the 
wholesale power market equilibrium (Lise & al, 2013; Chao, 2012; He & al, 2013; Dupont & al, 2014; 
Feueriegel & Neuman, 2014; Ruester& al, 2014).  
We then end up with all the essential bones of the existing EU target model being questioned: first, 
the day- ahead pricing; second, the market coupling; third, in the end, the final balancing centred on 
each TSO’s self- procurement. 
[III] And so what? King Target’s dead: long live the next King Target? 
It is easy to conclude that the existing EU target model has to restructure in order to offer a workable 
market integration of massive RES and a credible ex ante guarantee of future generation adequacy. 
However, this does not help in understanding why the European institutions have not yet settled the 
case for the next EU target model (see the Commission consultation draft of July 2015). Well, the 
logic of the European institutions behaviour is… institutional. What we used to call the “European 
Union” (which is, most of the time, the European Commission; while the European Council and 
Parliament are two voting co-legislators) has no direct regulatory powers. In the EU, the process of the 
production of law (being named either “EU directives” or “EU regulations”) is quite clear and simple; 
however, the production of detailed regulatory rules is not. In practice, producing “detailed regulatory 
rules” at the European level requires the enormous consent of numerous kinds of players, for the 
chance of having these “detailed regulation proposals” validated by the Member States. In the EU, the 
Member States literally vote on any “detailed regulation” framing, namely the “Comitology Process”. 
The European Union is not a typical federal state where the federal level lives its life and the federated 
states their own. In the EU, we have an intertwined framework where the federated states share the 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union (every semester), co-vote on the laws (in a Chamber 
called the “Council of the European Union”), and validate with a “qualified majority” in 
administrative committees (“Comitology Process”) the EU detailed regulation aimed at implementing 
the laws (these laws being called either EU “directives” or EU “regulations”).  
We have seen above that producing the existing EU power target model of today has been quite a 
journey. Furthermore, the production of the EU detailed regulatory framework to implement this first 
target model is not yet finished. To stop this ongoing process in an effort to open a new 
comprehensive process to define another “new target model” seems hazardous and perilous to many 
and frightens them all: the Commission, the EU agency ACER and quasi all the key stakeholders 
(national regulatory authorities, TSOs, utilities, etc.). This is why the commonly agreed moto in this 
new “Juncker Comission” era (since winter 2014) is “implementing our existing brave target model as 
it is”… with, why not, a few enhancements… (see the Commission consultation draft of July 2015).  
III-1 The European Commission has guns… 
The European Commission is not deprived of the necessary weaponry to respond to new trends in the 
electricity industry and the power system. It has the unilateral right and duty to ensure that the EU 
treaties are respected. It also has the monopoly of initiating and drafting new laws. Furthermore, it has 
executive rights in regards to the internal market (the freedom of goods and capital) and competition 
policy (as it relates to market abuse and state aids), as well as being responsible for the implementation 
of the internal market directives and regulations. However, this weaponry only extends to already 
existing frameworks and does not facilitate the drafting of new ones - particularly new normative 
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frameworks, as would typically be the case for new detailed market arrangements and regulatory rules. 
The Commission can, of course, threaten players and Member States who infringe upon a key rule(s). 
It can also enact unilateral guidelines, as it does from time to time in the Competition area; or open 
“enquiries”, which are essentially legal hunting for crude mistakes punishable by DG Comp (or dealt 
with in negotiation with the Commission, hence opening a grey bargain for ad hoc new rule- making). 
All of these powers, and associated tricks, are actually used by the Commission (see, for example, the 
energy sector enquiry 2005-2007 which opened the way to the 3d Package in 2009; the winter 2013 
guidelines to frame the “entry of RES support schemes and Capacity mechanisms into EU market 
competition rules”; or the fresh new sector enquiry opened in spring 2015 to hunt the field of 
“Member States Capacity Schemes”). While all of this exists, it does not transform these strong but 
reactive tools into pro-active tools. It does not provide a way to easily enact a new EU power target 
model which could be implemented across the EU.  
III-2 The European Commission’s ‘guns’ are not typewriters: The Energy Union manifesto  
I know that identifying how EU institutions actually work in the process of producing norms is not in 
the interest of all energy economists. It is, however, quite a useful exercise when studying applied 
energy policy- making. A key analytical proposal of contemporary “New Institutional Economics”, as 
with Oliver Williamson (Nobel Laureate 2009) or Paul Joskow (who has spent the past 30 years at 
MIT considering the building of “Markets for Power”) is “remediability”. In policy- making, 
economists should not ignore the actual conditions of implementation of the policies when they design 
“optimal policy programmes”. It is quite the opposite: the key task in policy- making is to identify the 
feasible policy options, and accordingly consider what could be achieved with these constraints.  
Although difficult, it is essential to identify the feasibility of implementing a new policy. This 
applies to the core “energy policy manifesto” issued by the European Commission at the end of 
February 2015 and welcomed by the European Council of MS one month later. In a surprising move, 
differing from the approach of the former two Commissions under Barroso, the new Juncker 
Commission revealed in its first semester of operation a comprehensive energy policy programme 
covering its full mandate period of 2014- 2019. And this entire five year programme is enshrined in a 
new high level policy concept: an “Energy Union”. In this, we inevitably have the European master 
programme in which the power target model will evolve until 2020. And actually, the Commission 
manifesto is rich in proposals for the internal market and its governance. It proposes to issue new draft 
legislation in 2016 for both the retail and wholesale markets; integrating RES; phasing-out non 
market- based support to RES; and coordinating MS actions for capacity mechanisms. Furthermore, 
another draft legislation is proposed for 2018 to provide an EU framework for the security of 
electricity supply which, inevitably, should touch upon existing MS schemes for the security of 
supply, including their capacity mechanisms. The existence of a comprehensive programme of such 
legislative targets suggests that an agenda for new detailed regulation may open in the aftermath if, 
and only if, these legislations were to be adopted. However, nobody yet knows, indeed nobody can 
know, the real content or the likely acceptance of such legislation. The Commission’s consultation 
draft on a new power market design, issued mid-July of 2015, draws complementary perspectives. 
But, as the new “Energy Union” is only a policy concept and not any new formal institution, all new 
legislative acts will still have to go through the usual hazardous journey of any EU law. And, there are 
seven existing directives and regulations being targeted for revision from July’s consultation draft. 
Furthermore, the support given by the Council to the Commission’s manifesto is conditional upon the 
strict respect of existing institutions in the process of creating the “Energy Union”. This means that the 
Council does not commit itself to call upon MS to support the legislative revision initiatives which 
will come from the Commission. No one can then predict the direction of EU legislation, and 
subsequent EU detailed regulation (as new or revised ACER guidelines and ENTSO-E codes), or how 
it might be directed toward reaching the 2030 goals.  
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Parallel to this legislative intent, the Commission manifesto and the consultation draft also suggest 
modifying the existing governance of the power sector by reviewing the framework created by the 3d 
Package. It notably calls for: a) increasing the power of ACER to further ‘Europeanise’ existing MS 
regulations and the corresponding actions of National Regulatory Authorities; b) creating subsidiaries 
to ENTSO-E as regional operational entities with their own rights and duties in the operation of the 
power system. One will immediately remember that the current EU target model had not been drafted 
in the text of the 3d Package but embedded in the creation of two new European bodies: ACER and 
ENTSO-E. At this point, one should see that the new Commission’s manifesto and consultation draft 
clearly flag the Commission’s intent to move towards a “de facto new” target model through the re-
design of these two key EU bodies. 
As we could have expected, knowing how the EU produces its detailed power regulation, we 
cannot expect to find a straight blueprint of the expected new power target model. It will come from 
the institutional shadow after the consultation opened in July. The only certainty that we (the reader 
and I) have is that the Commission and the key EU stakeholders have already opened the discussion of 
a “Target Model +” (See, for example, the ACER and CEER joint declaration in September 2015). 
This “Target Model +” is to be made of the existing model flanked with a new “short- term add-on” 
(being a reflexive framework for system flexibility) and a new “long- term add-on” (being a friendly 
internal market framework for the capacity adequacy guarantee and RES investment). 
[IV] Conclusions and Policy Implications  
Thirty years ago, European policy opened a new frontier: a single act for a single market. Ten years 
later, the first energy package started implementing it for the power sector. But, at that stage, even the 
EU did not foresee that a particular “market design” (a set of market and grid operation rules) was 
necessary to make any power market work at EU level. It took a further thirteen years to give 
institutional roots to a “Power Target Model”, while no such model was ever clearly described by the 
Commission or discussed by an EU legislator. Finally, the EU power target model has been produced 
in the aftermath of the 3d Package by the convergence between key stakeholders (such as the Florence 
Forum), the Commission and two new bodies born from the 3d Package: ACER and the ENTSO-E. 
This EU power target model has three key characteristics. Firstly, the core is the wholesale price- 
making in Day- Ahead PX trade. Second, the auxiliary is simplifying grids and flows for this Day-
Ahead trade and giving automatic “cross-border grid access” via “Market Coupling” mastered by the 
TSOs’ unilateral decisions. Last, and third, the loop between the market deals and the real grids, plus 
the actual flows, is also mastered by the TSOs in each of their zones in a monopsony “real-time 
procurement” process. 
The formidable changes brought into the power system by strongly expanding RES in a framework 
of open access for every national wholesale market already questioned the efficiency and the 
effectiveness of the existing target model (Glachant, 2015). The Commission, ACER, the ENTSO-E 
and many stakeholders (think utilities grouped in Eurelectric; traders in EFET; industrial consumers in 
EFIEC; etc.) are already looking beyond the current target model. They are discussing how to reach a 
“Target Model +” or a “Target Model 1.1” complemented with two add-ons. The first addition would 
be a “short term add-on” to give a reflexive framework for system flexibility at the intra-day and real 
time stage; and a second being a “long- term add-on” to build a friendly internal market framework for 
a capacity adequacy guarantee and RES investment. 
However, any cold reasoning shows that the questioning of the current EU target model cannot stop 
with these two add-ons. The reasoning stated above, in the second part, suggests that the EU “RES 
Push” will inevitably, sooner or later, shake up any enhanced version of the EU power target model. 
First, the existing zonal approach to wholesale pricing and system operation will inevitably weaken. 
The existing zones that we have today are not efficient from a market point of view and are not 
effective from a system point of view. They will then be more and more disputed: either to rationally 
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redesign (such as internal zoning in Norway and Sweden); or to take a “big bang” approach, like nodal 
pricing. Second, existing annual energy fixed price contracts, which are offered to households and 
SMEs, will be increasingly disputed because they disconnect these consumers from the system value 
of flexible demand. The retail market needed for a highly flexible system (with high penetration of 
wind and PV; and millions of prosumers) can work well only with dynamic retail pricing. Third, 
existing power system operators and regulators are national or sub-national entities. Both will 
inevitably have to increasingly regionalise and ‘Europeanise’ their data, principles, analyses, and 
decision-making. Fourth, and quite disruptively, the transmission grid and the whole TSO industry 
will lose a substantial part of its weight in the system operation and the implementation of the 
decisions of system players. With the high penetration of RES and millions of prosumers already 
acting as primary links between generation and load, the building of more flexible power systems will 
inevitably further develop while more “short local loops” of flexibility would make local grids, local 
flows, and local systems work better and safer. Distribution system operators (DSOs) will enter deeper 
into local actions interacting with the “global system operation” performed on transmission networks 
by the TSOs. The EU has a target model for the EU internal market and for the transmission system 
operation. It has none for EU “RES pocket markets” and for the distribution system operation. And 
legally, those are mainly “national subsidiarity affairs”. It is not a challenge: it is shift; a gap; or even a 
risk. It is a big leap forward. It calls for a totally new type of EU power target model: a real “2.0”. It 
may even be as big as a direct jump to a “3.3”: who really knows?  
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